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Abstract
In this case study, we report how a team of firefighters critiqued one of 
its member’s decisions to facilitate learning and process improvement. The 
study is supported by 500+ hr of ethnographic observations, documents, 
and 11 retrospective interviews, which captured how the team’s talk about 
the member’s decision shaped their interpretations of their own and others’ 
expertise—interpretations that ironically undermined learning. Constant 
comparative analysis revealed that these firefighters positioned themselves 
as experts by crediting either personal experience or technical knowledge 
and then discrediting the alternative way of knowing. We labeled this process 
epistemic denial. The process of epistemic denial was rooted in identity con-
cern; specifically, veteran team members relied on personal experience and 
newer members relied on technical information gained from training to assert 
their expertise, and to devalue others’ expertise. The article concludes with 
recommendations for avoiding problems associated with epistemic denial in 
high-reliability teams.
Keywords
team learning, expertise, decision making, high-reliability teams (HRTs), after 
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High-reliability organizations (HROs) are characterized, in part, by the 
importance of the tasks they accomplish. A firefighter team engaging in 
search-and-rescue for individuals trapped in a burning building is one such 
example of an HRO-in-action. HRO teams (hereafter, HRTs) function in 
places and situations where risk and danger are ever-present; thus, their need 
to be highly reliable because the cost of low reliability is often at the expense 
of human life and well-being. In situations that demand highly reliable per-
formance, risk and danger not only threaten the individuals directly affected, 
but also threaten the functioning of the team involved. The functioning of 
HRTs in these hostile environments may hold important insights for improv-
ing system interdependence by demonstrating how to enhance team mem-
bers’ mindfulness to system deviation and feedback. The logic proceeds as 
follows: If firefighters can maintain team functioning in the face of an 
extreme challenge like a burning building, how much more so should ordi-
nary teams, which confront mundane challenges, be able to sustain effective 
team functioning (Roberts & Bea, 2001)? Therefore, it is no wonder why 
such questions have led to intense scholarly interest in the subject of HRTs 
(Roberts, 1990; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
Scholars have investigated HROs like firefighter teams (Scott & Myers, 
2005), air traffic controllers (Weick, 1990), space missions (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007), healthcare teams (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), and 
aircraft carrier crews (Roberts, 1990) to name a few. Weick and his colleagues 
are especially well-known for their contributions in this area. Based on their 
research experiences and historical recreations of disasters, Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2007) recommend that top-level decision-makers, who want to 
improve the reliability of their organization’s team functioning, should 
attempt to enhance system-wide reluctance to simplify and defer to expertise 
(among other recommendations). To elaborate on these interdependent prin-
ciples for avoiding or buffering against failures, HRT members tend to show 
a reluctance to simplify processes and decision criteria, which allows them to 
encourage heightened awareness for a given situation and avoid meaningless 
categories that may inhibit innovation during chaotic situations. Also, these 
teams tend to show deference to expertise in that they violate traditional top-
down expectations of expertise and leadership and allow decision making to 
occur among team members, regardless of rank, wherever the most knowl-
edge of decision contingencies can be found. Taken together, these recom-
mendations represent a compelling and theoretically prescriptive scheme for 
providing principled advice to team members and leaders.
However, more work is needed to describe how Weick and Sutcliffe’s 
(2007) prescriptive HRO principles actually play out through messages and 
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decision-making processes shared among HRT members who may hold per-
sonal agendas, fragmented cultural assumptions, and identity concerns. 
Important work by Wilson, Burke, Priest, and Salas (2005) describes the 
specific team-related values necessary for successful team operations within 
HROs and therefore bridges HRO principles with principles for HRTs. 
Specifically, they argue that adaptability or flexibility influence teams with 
regards to being reluctant to simplify. The logic is that HRTs adjust and 
readjust their behaviors on an environment-based need by taking into 
account context and contingencies. Being aware of and adapting to present 
contingencies allows teams to guard against mindlessness and complacency. 
Wilson et al. (2005) also note that HRTs tend to value assertiveness and a 
collective orientation with regards to giving deference to expertise. In other 
words, HRTs praise members’ assertiveness rather than denigrate opposi-
tional opinions. Such affirmations of assertiveness build a collective (as 
opposed to individual) orientation within the team. HRTs recognize that “the 
knowledge or actions of one team member are important and must be taken 
into consideration . . . what another team member knows and does impacts 
on the rest of the team” (Wilson et al., 2005, p. 306). Teams that recognize a 
collective orientation refrain from positioning one member as the expert and 
instead, expect contingency-based expertise of all team members.
In this case study, we explain how Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) deference 
to expertise recommendation can unfold as a communicative and political 
process in which team members attempt to get others to view them as experts 
through epistemological argument. In addition, the outcome of such episte-
mological arguments holds implications for undermining system functioning 
by encouraging simplification, rather than a reluctance to simplify (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). In this way, our investigation adds to Weick and Sutcliffe’s 
framework by providing a nuanced and descriptive account of how HRT 
members come to understand whose knowledge is legitimate and authorita-
tive enough to be deemed expert. In the following paragraphs, we explain 
how knowledge and expertise are the products of interwoven meaning-making 
phenomena and how those meaning-making processes come to influence a 
team’s ability to learn and adapt.
The Powerful and Knowledge: Source and Force
In emergency situations, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) note that HROs tend to 
engage in deference to expertise, which should not imply that HROs tend to 
maintain a rigid hierarchy with top-down command. The authors explain that 
HROs tend to prevent compounding deadly scenarios by “pushing decision 
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making down and around . . . with authority migrating to the people with the 
most expertise, regardless of their rank” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 16). 
The concept of breaking with hierarchy so that frontline workers are free to 
engage in spontaneous improvisation given situational constraints is central 
to effective HRT functioning (Riley, Davis, Miller, & McCullough, 2010; 
Weick, 1998). Frontline workers are often the first to observe indications of 
trouble. Yet, in ordinary organizations, frontline workers may have a “reluc-
tance to speak up” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 73), usually for fear of retri-
bution and being associated with the content of bad news (e.g., Bisel, Kelley, 
Ploeger, & Messersmith, 2011; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; 
Morrison & Milliken, 2000). In contrast, effective HRTs overcome this prob-
lematic outcome of hierarchical relationships and get team members to be 
assertive by reinforcing a collective orientation and getting members to 
believe expertise is fluid and context based, rather than static and a-contextual. 
Wilson et al. (2005) explain this process ought to be observable among even 
junior HRT members.
Firefighters, who are first on the scene at a burning building, are a prime 
example of junior members of a team taking a lead position. Junior and low-
ranking firefighters, who are first inside a building, have a fuller understand-
ing of the incident in contrast to highly ranked officers—who are primarily 
stationed outside buildings. When ordinary organizational teams (non-HRTs) 
defer to the individual with the most legitimate-power authority or the 
highest-ranking official (i.e., deferring to authority) rather than the individual 
with the best understanding of local challenges (i.e., deferring to expertise), 
the consequences can be disastrous. Research suggests that when decision 
making becomes a closed system of information sharing and seeking, the 
consequence is that the ground for debate and innovation becomes eroded 
(Bazerman, 1988). If expertise is thought to be limited to a select few top-
level decision-makers, the standards for what an expert entails diminishes 
and becomes compartmentalized according to a source-attribute logic, rather 
than a logic of judging the quality of contributions. In such circumstances, 
expertise becomes projected through a rhetoric where source of argument 
(i.e., who is speaking) can be seen to outweigh the force of argument (i.e., 
what is being said), resulting in a loss of rigorous standards for critical evalu-
ation (Lyne & Howe, 1990). Hartelius (2011) explains, “Expertise is rhetori-
cal: a social and symbolic process, a relational logic at once real and imagined, 
theoretical and pragmatic” (p. 164).
Knowledge is power implies that the more knowledge one can accumu-
late the more power and influence one can gain. The insight perhaps dis-
guises an equally important point: Those who are powerful may wield a 
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disproportionate ability to convince us that their knowledge is special, legiti-
mate, and superior (Hartelius, 2011). Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) 
explained that “knowledge is justified true belief” (p. 636). Undoubtedly, 
individuals often seek to justify their beliefs as true and position themselves 
and these beliefs in the most advantageous way possible during their team 
interactions (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). Powerful individuals—
whether they have positional power, personal power, or both (Rahim, 
Antonioni, & Psenicka, 2001)—are especially influential in their ability to 
persuade others that their justifications and positionings are correct. Thus, 
the phrase, knowledge is power, can be seen as suggesting power is gained 
based on what one knows and can be framed in such a way as to suggest that 
the powerful are uniquely able to convince us that they are knowledgeable. 
Recall that according to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) successful HROs tend to 
defer to expertise and not necessarily authority. However, in actual practice, 
influential team members (e.g., supervisors or network hubs) likely hold a 
greater ability to get others to perceive them as expert, thereby complicating 
the practice of deferring to expertise. In other words, being considered 
expert often goes hand in hand with having power—influence that some 
may be unwilling to relinquish even in events where they have no special 
knowledge, insight, or understanding of the situation (i.e., expertise).
Team and Organizational Learning
Organizations that identify, develop, and use members’ expertise are known 
as learning organizations (Choo, 2006; for a review, see Weick & Ashford, 
2001). Organizational learning refers to a collective’s cultural store of 
know-how (Kramer, 2010). Organizational cultures marked by effective 
learning pass along lessons and innovations to itself through its members 
and use this knowledge to adapt to environmental challenges and to thrive 
(Choo, 2006; Weick & Ashfold, 2001). Organizational learning (or igno-
rance) often unfolds as team-level learning. In fact, Wilson et al. (2005) 
argue that encouraging the creation of HRTs is a way to achieve an HRO 
(see also Baker, Day, & Eduardo, 2006). Team learning occurs when team 
members share a culture that allows them to feel confident that they will not 
be embarrassed, rejected, or punished for speaking up with their insights 
and innovations (Edmondson, 1999). In sum, such teams encourage mem-
bers to be assertive with their input (Wilson et al., 2005). Failures in creat-
ing systems marked by learning can occur when teams fail to reflect on their 
actions as a collective, or when teams reflect but fail to implement changes 
following reflection (Edmondson, 2002). When a team fails to reflect or 
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fails to implement changes after reflection, the team is unlikely to contribute 
new knowledge or new ways of working that could help its performance in 
adapting environmental demands (Edmondson, 2002). The purpose of this 
study is to illustrate how reflection practices themselves (like those that 
occur in after action reviews) are predicated on how knowledge quality is 
framed (Fairhurst, 2011) and how this framing can both construct a position 
of expertise and discount others’ claims to expert status.
In system-level learning, knowledge must be recognized by multiple 
actors displaying or articulating their knowledge through their performance 
or explanation of a given task (Nonaka et al., 2006; Stehr, 1992, 1994). By 
blending both the individual position and the contributions of other team 
members, a joint enterprise comprised of different knowledge sets can be cre-
ated and recreated and subjected to influence by others (Iverson & McPhee, 
2008). Knowledge creation becomes a discourse of “making available and 
amplifying knowledge created by individuals as well as crystallizing and 
connecting it to” a team’s store of retrievable know-how (Nonaka & von 
Krogh, 2009, p. 635). Such stores of know-how become resources that team 
members draw from in their routine interactions with one another and with 
their environment (Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001). Often the tacit 
stores of collective know-how are inadvertently made observable (i.e., 
explicit) when members give accounts of task-related events. Giving accounts 
serves as a way for veteran team members to teach new members and justify 
behavior and action (Poole, Seibold, & McPhee, 1985). As a result, the dis-
course of such accounts of past actions serves as a way to reproduce team 
structure and culture simultaneously (Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004).
Often what becomes problematic is the transferring of knowledge to team 
members when there are multiple perspectives of knowledge regarding 
shared situations (Zorn & Taylor, 2003). Given the rhetorical nature of 
expertise, it stands to reason that rhetorical moves, which position one’s 
identity as expert, are likely common when multiple perspectives of knowl-
edge are pitted against each other in team discourse. What remains unclear, 
however, is how team members’ talk and collective sense making of their 
performance and decisions shapes members’ understandings of whose con-
tribution should be deemed expert and therefore worthy of transfer and pres-
ervation by the team?
Research Context
This research was conducted in the context of a municipal fire station. The 
first author gained access to observe the life and work of a firefighter team 
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and was allowed to participate in all daily activities, ranging from routine to 
emergency situations (For a summary of data collection, see Table 1). In one 
such emergency situation, a fully involved structure-fire, the first author was 
present to observe team communication from the beginning of the emer-
gency call (i.e., when the alarm sounded), the emergency itself, and subse-
quent conversations. While the firefighters were on location, the first author 
took 93 digital photographs of events as they unfolded. These photographs 
were later used by the team as a medium for critiquing the performance of a 
junior firefighter, who took a lead tactical role in the event. Post-emergency 
after action reviews (AARs), or reflection practices, were common practice—
as they are in many HRTs (e.g., Edmondson et al., 2001) and HROs (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007); however, typically, AARs usually rely on team members’ 
recollections and recreations of events. The presence of research photo-
graphs in this instance yielded visual cues for members’ AAR discussions. 
As such, the photographs provide a methodological advantage of this study 
in the sense that the facts of the circumstance and firefighters’ tactical deci-
sions are preserved and somewhat held constant, which allows a comparison 
between how team members assigned meanings to their actions during the 
critique with details that are verifiable within the visual evidence. AARs 
enable team members to make sense of their environment and actions 
Table 1. Stages of Data Collection
Month and year Description of data collected Resulting data
February (2010) Start Date: Field observations 
begin collection of archival data
46 pages policies
April (2010) Incident occurs  
 Observed team in action at 
structure-fire
93 photos
 Observed after action review 6 pages field notes
 Newspaper article 1 newspaper article
 Artifact collection 1 image
June (2010) Six team member interviews (1st 
round)
125 pages transcribed
September 
(2010)
Five fire-expert interviews manual 
consultation
56 minutes (total)
June (2011) Interview with Harrison (2nd 
round)
5 pages transcribed
December (2011) End date: field observations cease 
(22 months total)
403 pages field notes
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sgr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
14  Small Group Research 44(1)
collectively and to develop a shared vision for how to proceed in the future 
(Smith-Jentsch, Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, & Salas, 2008).
One such detail is particularly important to this investigation: A major 
point of contention arose among the team at the post-incident AAR, and con-
tinued intermittently for 3 more weeks, when a veteran firefighter claimed 
(and was then supported by other team members) that a junior firefighter—
who took the lead that day on the fire hose—used a so-called straight-stream 
configuration. In a veteran team member’s opinion, a fog configuration was 
better suited to the particular fire and structure. In turn, other team members 
appeared to agree with the veteran’s assessment of the junior firefighter’s 
performance. The resultant conflict appeared to invite team members to make 
a binary choice between two sides of the disagreement. Thus, while the dis-
agreement was two-sided, the conversation itself recurred among the entire 
team over many workshifts thereafter and speaks to the nature of conflict and 
team learning in an HRT environment. The way in which the post-incident 
critique discussions unfolded within the context of a HRT, led us to ask:
RQ1: How did the high-reliability team (HRT) members communicate 
about an important team performance?
RQ2: How did the HRT’s communication shape the ways in which 
team members come to understand their own and others’ expertise?
Method
Participants and Team Structure
The context of this research is situated in an incident resulting from a routine, 
post—structure-fire AAR. The team members who worked the scene were: 
Harrison (junior firefighter), Jack (veteran firefighter), California (rookie 
firefighter), Brice (acting captain, meaning he was serving in a position one 
rank higher during the fire), Rusty (acting driver, meaning he too was serving 
in a position one rank higher for the day), and Jackson (assistant chief and 
highest-ranking officer). Harrison was the lead firefighter on the hose with 
Jack behind him and California maintained a position third-in-line as backup. 
Again, Harrison chose to use a straight-stream water flow instead of a fog-
stream water flow. After the fire was extinguished, the team went back to the 
station for an AAR in which an argument over spray configurations broke 
out, initially between Harrison and Jack, and then was taken up by the rest 
of the team members, who aligned with Jack and participated with him in 
ridiculing Harrison.
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Interview Data Collection
All six team members involved in the incident (five of whom worked the 
actual fire and one other who was present during the post-fire discussions) 
were solicited for face-to-face interviews; all six agreed (see also a descrip-
tion of five more interviews and ethnographic and archival data collection 
below). Interviews were conducted in the fire station during work hours but 
were conducted privately in a conference room so that other team members 
could not hear each other’s answers. Interviews followed a 10-question 
schedule. Three additional tailored questions were asked of the target of the 
AAR and the instigator of the AAR. Follow-up questions were used to probe 
and clarify, including typical follow-up questions, such as, “What does that 
mean?” “Can you clarify?” and “Such as?” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; Rubin 
& Rubin, 2005). Each participant signed a consent form, in keeping with 
institutional review board oversight. Interviews lasted approximately 30 min. 
All interviews were digitally recorded. The first author transcribed record-
ings for words and utterances. Transcriptions were given to interviewees as 
a means for interviewees to grant permission to use materials: No changes or 
deletions were requested. Transcriptions resulted in about 125 double-spaced 
pages of text.
Ethnographic Data Collection
Similar to the ethnographic data collection processes of Scott and Myers 
(2005), the first author engaged in participant-observation methods among 
the firefighting team rotating in 24-hr shifts. Participants ranged from a 
rookie (2.5 years service) to assistant chief (24 years service). Ages of par-
ticipants ranged from 27 to 53. All participants were male and self-identified 
as Caucasian. The first author was included in activities ranging from station 
clean up, meal preparation, training, and ride-alongs (both to emergency 
situations and medical calls). As a means of developing understanding about 
the team and their task firsthand (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995), the first 
author engaged in informal, unstructured conversations with team members 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Periods of participant observation ranged from 8 
to 14 hr yielding a total dataset spanning 50 work shifts, which resulted in 
403 typed, double-spaced pages of field notes. In addition to typed field 
notes and transcribed interviews, the dataset consisted of cultural artifacts 
pertaining to the organization. These artifacts included a disparaging image 
related to the fire and AAR posted on the community bulletin board, a news-
paper article documenting the fire, and a number of organizational documents 
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(e.g., Department Handbook, Monthly Incident Report Summaries, Daily 
Unit Assignment Sheets, Unit Assignment Sheets, and Departmental 
Exposure Policy, see Table 1).
Data Analysis
In order to answer the research questions, we employed a modified ver-
sion of constant comparative analysis (Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Suddaby, 2006). First, the entirety of the dataset was read for the 
purpose of data reduction (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Interview transcript 
excerpts, field notes, and archival documents that contained (a) descrip-
tions of any aspect of the structure-fire and post-fire discussion, (b) judg-
ments regarding the decision to use stream or fog tactics, or (c) evaluations 
of others’ judgments regarding that decision were included in the dataset 
for answering the research question. Second, the remaining data were read 
and reread. A process of open-coding was then conducted as a means of 
identifying emergent and recurrent patterns (i.e., codes). As codes 
emerged, each was checked for better, opposite, or negative examples 
across the entirety of the remaining dataset. Third, in a process of focused 
coding, codes originated during open-coding were grouped into catego-
ries. Finally, in a process of axial coding, categories originated during 
focused-coding were interrogated for possible alternative explanations 
that could account for the interrelationships among them (Charmaz, 2000, 
2002). Codes and categories remained flexible until late in the analysis 
process. However, by the conclusion of the analysis all data were 
accounted for comprehensively within the theoretical framework pre-
sented in the results section (Tracy, 2010).
Results and Interpretation
In the following paragraphs, we explain how these firefighters’ discussion 
about the structure-fire was a moment of potential team learning. 
However, in this case, the team’s discussion unfolded as a struggle for 
achieving the identity of expert. Two methods of providing support for 
one’s expert identity were prominent: personal experience or technical 
knowledge. These methods of providing support for one’s claims reflex-
ively created an epistemological argument. Such discursive moves 
enabled a logical position from which to critique another team member’s 
decision making; simultaneously, such moves tended to discount others’ 
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ways of knowing, and therefore, discount others’ identities as experts. 
Thus, we show how these firefighters engaged in disqualifying each oth-
er’s critiques—whether supported by personal experience or technical 
knowledge—in a process we label epistemic denial (see Table 2). The 
resulting communication pattern observed among the firefighters’ attempts 
to engage in process improvement allowed us to see how epistemic denial 
is both functionally useful for firefighters’ individual identities, while 
potentially harmful for the team’s ability to learn and improve.
Sample raw data Second-order categories Sensitizing concept
• “So much of it is experience. That’s 
why these guys around here have like 30 
years of experience. That’s the 
fundamental problem that I have with 
the military: They have a lot of book 
smarts but they don’t have experience to 
draw from. And here we have the vice 
versa problem sometimes.”
• “They teach you in rookie school not to 
pass fire.”
• “You know, [you learn] through training 
and rookie class you learn some of it”
• “I learned what to do from magazines 
we have lying around here, books”
• “You learn fire behavior in rookie 
school…reading the basic manuals”
• “Most of what you learn comes from 
rookie school”
• “Don’t get so defensive, just listen [to me, 
the experienced firefighter] and learn”
• “You have to use some common sense. 
You learn as you go. I mean years ago 
there was no rookie class. You just 
showed up to work and them guys made 
it just fine.”
• “Well, I learned [what to do] just 
through the day-in and day-out 
experiences?”
• “That’s just how we do it here,”
• “I hope that he learned that not 
everything that you read in a book . . . is 
what you take to the fire scene with 
you.”
Technical
training
Personal
experience
Epistemic
denial
Table 2. Structure of Grounded Theorizing
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But First, Who’s Right?
In the course of the case study, the first author also interviewed five more 
firefighters who were neither present at the structure-fire or AAR nor on the 
same team as Harrison and Jack, as a means of evaluating advantages and 
disadvantages of Harrison’s stream selection: a fire inspector, a captain, a 
driver and two additional firefighters. Participants were asked about the 
advantages and disadvantages of both fog-stream and straight-stream con-
figurations. Responses indicated consistently that “straight-stream is good 
for deep seated fire whereas fog-stream is good for confined space and 
hydraulic ventilation” (9; notation represents interview participant number). 
Participants were also given a hypothetical scenario mirroring the conditions 
of the fire of interest and asked which stream configuration would be opti-
mal. Responses ranged from “you need to assess all on-scene conditions” 
(8) to “it really depends on the overall scene” (7). Ultimately, all responses 
were consistent in that participants reported that either stream selection could 
be effective. Thus, such responses indicate the inherently ambiguous nature 
of Harrison’s decision-making task. In sum, these sources reveal there was 
likely no single correct answer—a finding that warrants an analysis of how 
these team members’ communication rhetorically constructed identities of 
expertise, and did not merely constitute a disagreement over the validity of a 
particular approach.
Personal Experience Versus Technical Knowledge
Our analysis of the firefighters’ talk about the structure-fire and one anoth-
er’s performance revealed that these firefighters drew upon one of two bases 
of evidence and credibility to position themselves and their critiques as cor-
rect. Some firefighters based their evaluations on personal experience, mak-
ing comments such as “don’t get so defensive, just listen [to me] and learn” 
(1); and “You ain’t gonna learn anything if you don’t sit and reflect [on 
personal experience]” (4). Others based their evaluations on technical knowl-
edge learned from classroom training or firefighting manuals with comments 
such as “they teach you in rookie school not to pass fire” (3).
Personal Experience. The veteran firefighters explained how they mastered 
their craft by making comments like, “Well, I learned [what to do] just 
through the day-in and day-out experiences?” (6). They described their 
expertise as emerging from “common sense” (1), “just knowing” (1, 2, 4, 6), 
and with statements such as “That’s just how we do it here” (1, 2, 4, 5, 6), and 
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“That’s just the way I was taught” (1, 2, 4, 5, 6). In addition, many reported 
learning their craft through observing veteran firefighters when they, them-
selves, were newer firefighters. For example, “We put the fire out and he 
taught me how to do hydraulic ventilation, which is spraying a water pattern 
out a window, which evacuates the smoke from the house” (4). In fact, the 
transmission of personal experience was institutionalized in this particular 
team in that certain veteran firefighters were hired with the expressed pur-
pose of teaching newer firefighters their experiences. For example, one fire-
fighter explained, “I had a little bit of knowledge [about fixing trucks, 
therefore] they expected me to help these guys and teach them.” The chief 
commented, “I explained [to the rookies] that I brought [veteran firefighter, 
Jack] down here for a reason [pause] to teach.”
Similarly, veteran firefighters characterized their predecessors as heroic 
and worthy of esteem regularly:
I was asked to come down here or told [gesturing with air quotes] but 
asked, “This is why: to help with the younger guys,” I learned how to 
fight fire through some hard people but they was some firefighting 
people. They knew how to do it. Now none of those guys are really 
left. (1)
These statements serve to depict a team and organization that values and 
glorifies experience and relies on that experience to train new team members 
as a mark of one’s expertise. By valuing members with greater experience, 
other ways of knowing are subtly undervalued and a cultural assumption that 
experience leads to expertise is reinforced. In addition, in an organization 
that values experience, it stands to reason that the title of expert, which is 
inherently a privilege, would tend to be reserved for those team members 
with long tenure.
Implications for Identity
It is important to note that as the team evolved over time, the amount and 
intensity of training required by its organization also evolved. This training 
evolution created an important context for these arguments and their implica-
tions for identities: Members of the team with more than a decade of service 
received relatively little formal training compared to the 6-month curriculum 
newer firefighters were required to pass. In this new training program, recruits 
endured a curriculum that included 3,000 mandatory lecture hours, 30 written 
examinations, in addition to 30 days of training drills in firefighting tactics. 
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The following excerpt from Jack, the instigator of the post-fire AAR and 
advocate of experience, illustrates how this difference in training became a 
point of identity threat for veteran firefighter members, who were not required 
to pass the rigorous Academy demands. In this quote, Jack reflects on his 
assessment of Harrison’s decision to use a straight-stream configuration:
You have to use some common sense. You learn as you go. I mean 
years ago there was no rookie class. You just showed up to work and 
them guys made it just fine. I hope that [Harrison] learned that not 
everything that you read in a book is what you take to the fire scene 
with you. (1)
This discourse both (a) discounts technical knowledge learned in fire training 
and (b) shuts down opposition by suggesting that common sense (and likely 
experience; “learn as you go”) is enough to achieve mastery. Logically, if a 
team member disagreed with Jack’s position by championing technical 
knowledge, he may be criticized for lacking common sense. If a member 
championing technical training does not respond, the lack of response may 
be seen as acquiescence, thereby resulting in effective silencing and perhaps 
the perception of agreement. In other words, such a counterargument would 
lose ipso facto. In fact, two of the team members confided in the first author 
that they avoid disagreements with Jack because engaging in debate with 
him tends to invite his ridicule. Perhaps it is not surprising then, that when 
the spray configuration contention was initiated by Jack, other team mem-
bers adamantly agreed during the AAR. For example, Brice commented, 
while looking at a picture of Harrison using a straight-stream, “Look at that 
f*cking idiot,” and California announced that Harrison is “a f*cktard.”
Thus, the discourse ultimately became a (rather childish) matter of win-
ning a debate rather than providing multiple perspectives and resisting over-
simplification of localized team decision making. Team members, who could 
have offered alternative interpretations to the emerging binary opposition, 
were afraid of Jack’s ridicule and participated in his ridicule of another team 
member by being sycophants. In one such instance, Brice perpetuated the 
epistemic denial when 2 days after the AAR he posted a disparaging image, 
hand labeled in all capital letters “STRAIGHT-STREAM HARRISON,” on 
the station’s main bulletin board. The image, taken from the internet, depicts 
a toothless likeness of Harrison wrestling (and losing to) a straight-stream 
water configuration. This action serves to undermine Harrison’s argument by 
making a public mockery of his argument and depicts him as a fool (or lack-
ing common sense) for his tactical decision making. Again, epistemic denial 
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is produced, not through means of reasoned argument, but by connecting 
Harrison’s claims with a visual image meant to undermine and discredit his 
position and claim to be able to contribute knowledgeably to the team’s 
learning.
From an identity perspective, positioning experience as the predicate of 
expertise yields expectations that the person with the longest tenure on the 
team will always be the most expert, a sentiment framed by the following 
statement from Jack:
Some people think they know it all and they just need to learn . . . I can 
help the younger guys just cause we’ve done it longer. The more expe-
rience you have with certain situations, the more open-minded you can 
stay instead of when you got a guy that has two years on and he goes 
in with a straight-stream, it’s not putting out no fire. (1)
This framework suggests that the only legitimate way a newer team member 
can learn is if shown or taught by a veteran member. The purpose of the 
veteran member’s expertise is established and maintained. As a reinforcing 
comment, Jack said contemptuously, regarding Harrison: “Modern technol-
ogy, there is so much information available to ‘em so they can pull it up on 
their computer and read about it and that makes ‘em an expert. [The new 
hires] already know-how to do everything.” In this quote, he conveys epis-
temic denial by condemning technology and the technical knowledge it com-
municates in addition to implying that two years is insufficient experience to 
achieve expertise. His frustration is apparent when expressing his opinion on 
the technological (as opposed to human) source of information. The frustra-
tion may stem from feeling circumvented as an expert source of information.
Technical Knowledge
The following statements are from newer team members who accomplished 
the rigorous training program, describing how they learned the skills needed 
for their craft: “That, oh I learned that from drivers books” (4), “I know that 
[technique] from rookie school, [pause] reading the basic manuals” (5), and 
“Most of what you learn comes from rookie school [pause] the basics about 
how to put fire out; how fire starts and grows [pause] and all these magazines 
we have laying around” (3). At the height of contention over the choice to 
use straight-stream water configuration, Harrison—invoking his technical 
knowledge of other fire departments’ standard procedures—claimed that 
using a straight-stream is, “a sound tactic. There are cities that don’t even 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sgr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
22  Small Group Research 44(1)
have nozzles that go into a fog; they just have nozzles that go straight-
stream.” Harrison’s words were another, less successful, and, perhaps less 
obvious, example of epistemic denial. His denial implies his position should 
be correct by contrasting it with equipment choices available in other 
cities—a claim that originated from survey-based knowledge, not from per-
sonal experience.
Implications for Identity
The statements that articulate expertise gained from technical training also 
serve a purpose in situating the identities of team members utilizing such 
statements. As the experience-based statements create purpose for veteran 
team members, the statements focusing on technical knowledge compete 
with veteran firefighters’ claims to contribute to the team’s attempts at pro-
cess improvement. In a similar comment Harrison advocated a way of view-
ing expertise separate from matters of time and experience:
So much of it is experience, that’s why these guys around here have 
like 30 years of experience. But that’s the fundamental problems that I 
have with the military. They have a lot of book smarts but they don’t 
have experience to draw from. And here we have the vice versa prob-
lem sometimes—meaning not as much technical knowledge but a huge 
wealth of experience. (3)
First, a noteworthy dynamic is that Harrison picks up and uses the false 
binary present in Jack’s epistemological reasoning as well: Within this logic, 
the counterpart of personal experience is technical knowledge, leaving team 
members to determine the preferred epistemology. Harrison does not dis-
credit those with experience completely; however, he does consider it a 
problem if not accompanied by technical knowledge. Here, the team appears 
either unwilling or unable to reframe their experiences without assuming a 
bifurcation between ways of knowing. Notice, in Harrison’s account, too 
much of one or not enough of the other is problematic instead of representing 
different strengths from which to draw. As a polar construct is created, the 
space for these members to coauthor a different interpretation—one charac-
terized by a reluctance to simplify (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) and a collective 
orientation (Wilson et al., 2005)—is lost. Again, what is being reinforced is 
a rigid emphasis on only one epistemological input (i.e., personal experi-
ence) leaving little space for multiple perspectives of how Harrison handled 
localized decision making. In the weeks following the AAR, technical 
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knowledge was discounted through ridicule of Harrison. Members of the 
team made comments to Harrison, such as, “It’s a good thing that you can do 
some doctoring [medical assistance] because you damn sure can’t do any-
thing else [i.e., firefighting]” (1), comments that led team members to note 
that Harrison was “rode into the dirt [for his tactical decision]” (6). In the 
end, these social circumstances led Harrison to reduce the assertive force 
behind voicing his opinion, which, in turn, led team members to be confident 
the matter was settled: Fog streams are preferable tactics; Jack has experi-
ence and is the expert; Harrison has technical knowledge and is a fool.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to understand how HRT members communicated 
about an important team performance, and how the HRT’s communication 
shaped the ways in which team members come to understand their own and 
others’ expertise. We achieved each goal by explaining how constructions of 
personal experience and technical training invited the members of the team 
to communicate about a team performance through a process we labeled 
epistemic denial. Epistemic denial occurs when ways of knowing are dis-
counted or disqualified, often as a means of positioning one’s identity as 
expert and another’s identity as illegitimate or unworthy. We illustrated how 
epistemic denial was utilized by the firefighters in framing their account of 
Harrison’s tactical choices. The process of epistemic denial is rooted in iden-
tity concern. In this case, veteran team members relied heavily on personal 
experience-based knowledge and a new member relied on technical informa-
tion gained from rigorous and extensive training in order to present their own 
identities as worthy of being deemed expert. The outcome of the team’s 
epistemic denial was a systemic simplification of decisional inputs (i.e., fog 
streams are preferable, despite circumstantial ambiguities) and a cultural 
reinforcement that experience knows best (i.e., only experienced veteran 
members’ have the moral right and expertise to assign meaning and evaluate 
action). Such a cultural development challenged important HRT values like 
assertiveness and collective orientation in that their communication behavior 
disqualified the junior team members’ contributions and other contributions 
based on technical knowledge. This kind of unproductive feedback is espe-
cially disheartening given Smith-Jentsch, Salas, and Baker’s (1996) finding 
that healthy feedback is associated with team members’ assertiveness.
Furthermore, these findings connect to the literature on HRTs and their com-
municative relationship with team learning in four ways: (a) epistemic denial 
demonstrates that deferring to expertise may unfold as a socially contested and 
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negotiated process; (b) epistemic denial gains strength from silencing and dis-
counting opposing sources of knowledge; (c) epistemic denial is rooted in ego-
centric identity concerns relating to power; and (d) epistemic denial illustrates 
how in actual practice, deference to expertise can become settled in such a way 
as to encourage simplification, rather than to encourage a reluctance to simplify 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Wilson et al., 2005).
Epistemic denial is a socially constructed process that may, at times, 
unfold as a struggle or negotiation and is not limited to individuals, but 
enacted collectively by teams and organizations embodying the values, 
beliefs, and goals of the collectivity (Nicolini & Meznar, 1995; Weick, 1995). 
The role that epistemic denial plays here is in silencing some of the values, 
beliefs, and goals of the collectivity. In the process of working out whose 
knowledge should rightfully be deemed expert, team members may look to 
each other for answers about what is considered expertise and who the expert 
is (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The search for who is considered expert hinders 
the collective orientation mentality crucial to HRTs’ healthy functioning 
(Wilson et al., 2005). The quality of members’ discourse plays a crucial role 
in how they come to understand or make sense of (Weick, 1995) expertise 
and who has it.
This case study illustrated that during this negotiation process these fire-
fighters framed their expert identity as based on either personal experience 
or technical knowledge. In addition, these firefighters discounted the other 
basis of knowing and any expertise that could be claimed from it (i.e., epis-
temic denial). Again, this discourse plays a part in discounting the veracity 
of one claim or another. Specifically, the veteran firefighters showed con-
tempt for newer team members’ reliance on what they learned through their 
technical training. At the same time, the newer members fought for both the 
opportunity to be heard and to contribute meaningfully. Thus, similar to 
Hartelius’s (2011) observation, these firefighters positioned themselves as 
experts, in part, by articulating their epistemological basis of knowing. 
Hartelius explained, “In sum, the reason experts explicate their epistemolo-
gies . . . so elaborately is that doing so creates the impression of techne. It 
suggests to an audience that expertise exists, and that the expert is authentic 
and genuine” (p. 22). In the end, the winners of the contention over the 
tactical decision (i.e., veteran firefighters touting the merits of personal 
experience over technical knowledge) gained moral authority and per-
ceived credibility—both of which are problematic in HRTs trying to 
enhance members’ mindfulness and assertiveness, while avoiding mem-
bers’ tendency to simplify decisional inputs (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; 
Wilson et al., 2005).
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The second characteristic of epistemic denial is that it gains strength from 
silencing and discounting opposing sources of knowledge. Not only does 
epistemic denial produce a problematic lack of receptivity to new informa-
tion (i.e., the problem associated with simplification), but it may tend to 
silence innovative and new ideas shared from alternative ways of knowing—
the way Jack functionally silenced not only Harrison but also affected the 
likelihood the rest of the team would disagree with his position by ridiculing 
others frequently. Wilson et al. (2005) advocate that team members, espe-
cially junior HRT members, must feel encouraged to be assertive. They 
explain that welcoming HRT member assertiveness involves: “Allowing 
team members the opportunity to provide feedback,” “address[ing] ambigu-
ity,” and “offer[ing] potential solutions.” Environments that fail to foster 
these team-based behaviors might lead to a lack of team learning (Cook & 
Yanow, 1993).
Third, epistemic denial is rooted in egocentric identity concerns relating to 
power. Our analysis demonstrates that the recommendation to defer to experts 
has the opportunity to become a struggle of power identities in actual prac-
tice. We believe HRTs can avoid this dynamic by taking steps to encourage 
people to make knowledge about the system transparent, widely known, and 
to “create a set of operating dynamics that shifts leadership to the people who 
currently seem more likely to have an answer to the problem at hand” (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 81). Also, in the case of these firefighters, we believe 
that if all firefighters went through the same training, veteran firefighters may 
not have been as threatened by knowledge claims—and related claims to 
expertise—based on technical knowledge. If all had the same training, they 
may have been more willing to compare and contrast the relative merits of 
tactics, rather than the relative merits of epistemology. Shifts in entry require-
ments and training can be uncomfortable for veteran team members, who 
may believe that expertise is gained through paying dues—especially, if such 
a process was required of them. The mentality of working one’s way up to 
achieve voice and the perception of being expert may cause members to be 
unsure of how much time must pass before they are considered seasoned 
enough to contribute meaningfully to the team conversations, which produce 
the kind of appreciative reflective practices associated with healthy HRTs 
(Edmondson et al., 2001).
Further complicating a veteran-centric approach is the reality that newer 
generations entering the workforce may be more familiar and more comfort-
able with technological advancements and globalization. Often, older mem-
bers of an organization may struggle to yield the floor to a younger team 
member because of the social implications that accompany such a 
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relinquishment. An older team member may refuse to relinquish the floor as 
a response to the perceived threat that the younger team member may con-
tribute better ideas and upstage the older member’s contribution. Once posi-
tioned as an expert, the potential for that person to be sought out for 
information increases (Poole et al., 1985). A response to the threat of being 
upstaged is to enact epistemic denial by discounting the technical knowledge 
utilized by the younger team member in favor of personal experience being 
the only acceptable expertise. After all, by this logic, the team member with 
the most experience will always have the most expertise, never losing their 
epistemological superiority.
Hinds and Pfeffer (2003) explained how hierarchical structuring may 
inadvertently motivate organizational subgroups, like teams, to avoid engag-
ing in knowledge transfer with other subgroups out of a sense of competition 
for organizational resources. We believe their claims are sound; however, we 
also believe that such claims may tend to obscure another insight about 
knowledge transfer: Knowledge is the result of a communicative process of 
negotiation (i.e., learning) and may be the result of identity-motivated com-
petition within divisional teams.
Fourth, and finally, this case study illustrates how in practice, knowing 
whose knowledge is worthy to be deemed expert can become settled through 
discourses that discount some team members’ contributions as inadequate. 
When such epistemic denial occurs—and ways of knowing like technical 
knowledge are discounted—team members have effectively simplified deci-
sional inputs. Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) recommend that successful HRTs 
tend to enact a reluctance to simplify decision making, which helps members 
match complex decision circumstances with similarly complex decisional 
inputs. Epistemic denial discussed here may encourage simplification instead 
of encouraging a reluctance to simplify. Thus, while epistemic denial is first 
and foremost related to the concept of deferring to expertise, we argue that 
epistemic denial may undermine the decision making of HRTs—a point that 
aligns with Hirokawa and Rost’s (1992) vigilant interaction theory.
Conceptualizing an Epistemic Denial Variable
Based on these field observations, it would seem that epistemic denial could 
vary as a function of the intensity, duration, and frequency of voiced or publi-
cally displayed ridicule directed at a team member or members’ way of know-
ing. High epistemic denial can be recognized here in Jack, California, and 
Brice’s attacks of Harrison’s training-centric claims to expertise, which 
included aggressive name-calling and public humiliation, and unfolded over 
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weeks. Presumably, low epistemic denial would unfold as relatively less-
intense ridicule, for a shorter-term period, and with less frequent attacks on 
members’ ways of knowing. Furthermore, the case suggests potential anteced-
ents of an epistemic denial variable may include coalition formation emerging 
from threats to team members’ identities as experts, the defensiveness of a 
group’s climate, and its tolerance for verbal aggressiveness. Also, epistemic 
denial in teams might be especially likely when common knowledge effect and 
shared-information bias emerge in a group’s discussions about its own perfor-
mance. Shared-information bias may lead group members to discuss a major-
ity’s known method to perform a work task more often than a minority’s 
alternative (Bonito, 2007; Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). The 
majority’s information sharing then may come to represent a kind of social 
proof in which the rightness of the method is supported by the fact so many 
know of the method—not that the method is superior, but more well-known. 
Such a social context might invite discourse in which majority team members 
ridicule minority members’ ways of knowing (i.e., engage in epistemic denial). 
We speculate the result of shared-information bias followed by epistemic 
denial would be an exacerbation of a team’s inability to take advantage of 
members’ unique knowledge and expertise. Consequences of epistemic denial 
likely include the reduction of HRT functioning, especially in team members’ 
assertiveness and collective orientation. When not functioning correctly, these 
team processes are argued to be associated with a reduction in the long-term 
learning capacity of HRTs in that they stunt deference to expertise and a reluc-
tance to simplify—values characteristic of HROs (Wilson et al., 2005).
Practical Recommendations
As a means of reducing the occurrence of epistemic denial in teams, we make 
four recommendations. First, we recommend HRT leadership should make 
members aware of the negative consequences of positioning technical knowl-
edge and personal experience epistemologies as though they are in competi-
tion for legitimacy. Thus, we assume that awareness is probably curative in its 
own right, although we concede that assumption needs to be tested. Second, 
we recommend HRT leaders be trained (a) to recognize the development of 
epistemic denial in AARs in order, (b) to affirm the value of multiple perspec-
tives from team members, and (c) to suppress team tendencies to simplify 
decisional inputs. Third, organizations should require veteran team members 
to update their knowledge sets such that they receive similar training and 
achieve similar credentials as newer members. We believe this move will 
somewhat mitigate the influence of identity concerns that veteran members 
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may feel, if threatened by newer team members’ technical knowledge and 
related expertise. Fourth, we recommend team members who are experienc-
ing epistemic denial experiment with communication strategies that present 
their position in proximal ways rather than take up and reproduce distal posi-
tionings implied by others’ discourse (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999).
Limitations and Future Directions
This study, like all studies, has limitations. These data do not trace the outcome 
of the epistemic denial apparent in team members’ discourse on its projected 
learning. Indeed, many scholars have grappled with the difficulty of measuring 
team learning (e.g., Goodman & Dabbish, 2011). In other words, we do not 
know whether Harrison or other team members would use a straight-stream or 
a fog-stream configuration if placed in a similar situation again. Future 
research could also focus on how members of a team, when faced with epis-
temic denial, cope with the disqualification of their contributions. Similarly, 
we foresee future research can assess the extent to which team members who 
have been the target of epistemic denial either accept or deny others’ position-
ing of them and the implications that stem from this choice. One way to test 
the notion of epistemic denial would be to attempt to disconfirm the implied 
association presented here between individuals’ use of epistemic denial com-
munication strategies with team members, and either (a) the speakers’ or 
(b) team members’ perceptions of the speakers’ expertise. Furthermore, likely 
covariates include likeability and credibility assessments.
Conclusion
Knowledge may lead to power, but the powerful have a disproportionate 
ability to convince others that their own knowledge is worthy and other 
knowledge bases are insufficient. Such meaning-making is the outcome of 
team discourse. Team learning and ignorance are parallel mediums and out-
comes of team communication. The discursive moves made in a single con-
versation (in this case, a post-fire AAR) are not merely inconsequential in the 
face of an entire organization’s strategic adaptation, but come to form its 
very substance.
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